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Abstract
We augment an otherwise standard business cycle model with a richer government sec-
tor, and add a modified cash in advance considerations, and one-period-ahead nominal
wage contracts. In particular, the cash in advance constraint of Cooley and Hansen
(1989) is extended to include private investment and government consumption. This
specification, together with the nominal wage rigidity, when calibrated to Bulgarian
data after the introduction of the currency board (1999-2016), gives a role to money in
propagating economic fluctuations. In addition, the combinations of these ingredients
allows the framework to reproduce better observed variability and correlations among
model variables, and those characterizing the labor market in particular.




1 Introduction and Motivation
It is a well-known fact, e.g. Prescott (1986), that the perfectly-competitive (Walrasian)
approach to modelling labor markets in real business cycles (RBC) does not fit data well,
and thus creates a ”puzzle” for neoclassical economists. More specifically, in the standard
RBC model the fluctuations in employment are due to technology shocks shifting the labor
demand curve, and hours worked responding to these movements along the labour supply
curve. In other words, households increase hours in the face of a raise in the return on labor,
the wage, driven by shocks to technology. Instead, if an RBC model is to fit data better along
the labor market dimension, even for a small economy like Bulgaria, shocks that work on
labor demand and shift it around would be much better candidates to explain the observed
fluctuations in the wage rate, aggregate hours and employment.
In order to avoid running into the problem of ”observational equivalence,” an outcome in
which two or more models of substantially different structure may explain equally well certain
stylized facts, economists need to justify the inclusion of alternative propagation mechanisms.
Therefore, in this paper we base our modeling approach on a particular empirical regularity
in Bulgaria, namely a pre-contracted nominal wage of duration one year, which is the norm
in the period following the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999-2016).
Indeed, annual nominal wage contracts are an important element of labor market reality in
Bulgaria (and other continental European countries), as a large proportion of the labor force
in Bulgaria are wage-earners, and a large portion of the labor force in manufacturing in par-
ticular engages in long-term wage contracting. In addition, the justification for the existence
of such wage contracts is provided by Danziger (1988), and Gomme and Greenwood (1994),
who demonstrate that pre-setting the wage rate in nominal terms can be an optimal way for
workers to achieve efficient risk sharing over the cycle, and that is why workers engage in
such contracts instead of say, renting their services in a spot market for labor.1
Note that one-period ahead nominal wage contracts used in this paper work in a differ-
ent way than spot market (Walrasian labor market) contracts. While in the latter, labor
1One year indexation is also very close to optimal contract duration of 4 quarters, established in Cho,
Cooley and Planeuf (1997).
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supply is driven by the intertemporal substitution hypothesis, i.e. the household will increase
(decrease) hours worked in response to an increase (decrease) in the market wage rate, in an
economy with wage contracts, variability in hours and employment will be driven by fluctu-
ations in labor demand. The pre-contracted wage rate is equal to the rational expectation of
the wage that would prevail at the labor market equilibrium of an economy with spot labor
markets. At any time period, the nominal wage is then fixed, and the real wage will depend
on the price level. This level depends on the monetary shocks (but in this model we do not
have such shocks). Equilibrium employment level is then determined by the firm which uses
its labor demand curve. The households accept to work as much as the firm needs them
to, as it is the firm that specified and posted the nominal wage contract. Therefore, the
variability of employment and hours will effectively depend on the firm side.
We adopt the approach followed by Cho (1993) and Cho and Cooley (1995) to incorporate
one-period nominal wage contracts in RBC models in order to investigate the quantitative
effect on business cycle fluctuations in aggregate variables in Bulgaria, and labor markets
in particular.2 We then proceed to evaluate how the presence of contracting issues affects
business cycle fluctuations, and whether this non-Walrasian setup in the labor market, that
some transactions are conducted at non-clearing prices, is able to address the ”labor market
puzzle,” and validate certain labor market facts, while at the same time retain technology
as the only shock process.3
As much as possible, we would stay within the RBC framework. However, since the wage is
set in nominal terms, we need to introduce money in the setup through the cash-in-advance
(CIA) constraint. More specifically, we assume that money is valuable as agents need to
possess cash in order to make purchases for consumption or investment purposes. This
assumption has already been used in Cooley and Hansen (1989), where only consumption
2We also abtsract away from staggered and overlapping wage contracts, such as Gray (1976) and Fischer
(1977), and Talor (1980), as their modelling approach which interferes with model tractability. We also do
not explore the optimal indexation issue, ot the welfare cost of indexation.
3Note that a model with zero-period nominal wage contracts and is de facto a spot market for labor.
In addition, in the presence of a CIA constraint such a model will feature the real-nominal dichotomy, i.e.
money will be neutral.
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was constrained bu the CIA. In this model, we assume that all components of output -
private consumption, private investment, and government consumption - are all featured in
the CIA constraint.4 This is one of the novelties in this paper. In addition, in the face of
nominal wage rigidities, money is no longer neutral (even though households feature rational
expectations). More specifically, money will have a real effect, and given one-period nominal
wage contracts, the response will be concentrated in the first few periods after a technology
shock. In the model in this paper, both the second moments and the correlations of the
main aggregate variables with output are affected. Importantly, real wages become a lagging
variable, which helps with the dynamic correlation between hours and wages. Given the
particular focus on labor markets, we abstract away from nominal variables, whose cyclical
properties are badly reproduced nonetheless. One reason is the short time series, the fact
that Bulgaria is not fully developed. Last but not least, the model is primarily real in nature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model framework and
describes the decentralized competitive equilibrium system, Section 3 discusses the calibra-
tion procedure, and Section 4 presents the steady-state model solution. Sections 5 proceeds
with the out-of-steady-state dynamics of model variables, and compared the simulated second
moments of theoretical variables against their empirical counterparts. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 Model Setup
There is a representative household, which derives utility out of consumption and leisure.
The time available to households can be spent in productive use or as leisure. The household
engages in nominal wage contracts, where the nominal wage rate is determined one period
(year) in advance. The government taxes consumption spending and levies a common tax
on all income, in order to finance wasteful purchases of government consumption goods, and
government transfers. The monetary authority follows an exogenous money supply rule,
4Hairault and Portier (1995) also include private investment in the CIA. However, their model does not
incorporate a government sector. In contrast, Fairise (1995) includes both private investment and government
consumption in the CIA constraint, but their setup also features investment and employment adjustment
costs.
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and redistributes all seigniorage back to the household. On the production side, there is
a representative firm, which hires labor and utilized capital to produce a homogenous final
good, which could be used for consumption, investment, or government purchases.
2.1 Household problem
Each household maximizes expected discounted utility, which, as in Cho (1993) and Cho















where E0 is the expectation operation conditional on information available as of t = 0,
0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, ct is individual household consumption in period t, nt are
hours worked, and et is the employment probability. Parameters θ1, θ2 > 0 are the weights
attached to disutility of work, while parameters γ and σ capture the curvature of the utility
function in hours and employment. The particular form (integration of hours and employ-
ment) is based on Kydland and Prescott (1991) and Cho (1994), who use aggregation and
lotteris as in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) to convexify a discrete labor supply deci-
sion at individual level - work either zero hours or a full-time - to derive the preferences of
an aggregate household. In particular, in equilibrium, a households will be chosen for work
every period with a probability et, which, form the law of large numbers, will also equal the
employment rate.
The household starts with a positive endownment of physical capital, k0, in period 0, which
is rented to the firm at the nominal rental rate Rt, that is, before-tax capital income equals
Rtkt.
5 Therefore, each household can decide to invest in capital to augment the capital stock,
which evolves according to the following law of motion:
kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt, (2)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
5As a convention, real variables will be defined in smallcase, while capital letters will be used for the
nominal variables.
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In addition to the rental income, the household owns the firm, and thus has a legal claim
to the firm’s nominal profit, Πt. It may also decide to buy government debt, which pays a
nominal interest rate of ibt . Lastly, the household agrees to work a certain number of hours,
to be determined by the firm, at a one-period ahead precontracted nominal wage rate W ct ,
producing a total nominal labor income of W ct etnt in period t.
The budget constraint of the aggregate household, expressed in real terms, is then





















where τ c is the tax rate on final consumption, τ y is the proportional rate on labor and capital
income, gtt are real government transfers, Pt is the aggregate price level, i
b
t is the nominal
interest rate on bonds. Mt and Bt denote the nominal quantities of money stock and bond
holdings in period t, respectively). Money stock is treated like a consumption good, it stores
wealth over time. That is why real money balances in period t are mt = Mt/Pt in period t+1
only buy Mt/Pt+1 (next period purchasing power). Also, real bond holdings, bt = Bt/Pt.
Similarly, wct = W
c
t /Pt, and rt = Rt/Pt are the real wage and the real interest rate.
Real money balances are needed to purchase output, hence the households face the following
cash-in-advance constraint




























− (1 + ibt)
Bt
Pt


















= (1 + τ c)(λt + µt) (6)
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n1+γt = λt(1− τ y)wctnt, (8)
kt+1 : λt + µt = βEt
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and the boundary (transversality) conditions for capital, real money balances and real bond
holdings:
TV Ck : lim
t→∞
βtλtkt+1 = 0 (12)
TV Cm : lim
t→∞
βtλtmt+1 = 0 (13)
TV Cb : lim
t→∞
βtλtbt+1 = 0 (14)
The interpretation of the optimality conditions is standard. In the first, the household
equates the marginal utility of consumption, to the VAT adjusted shadow price of wealth
and the CIA constraint. The second and the third FOC determine optimal number of hours
worked and probability of employment (or employment rate), by balancing at the margin
the cost and benefit from working. The remaining equations from the original FOCs are
standard: for example, the Euler equation for capital stock describes how capital is allocated
across any adjacent periods in order to maximize household’s utility. The transversality
conditions (TVCs) for real cash holdings, real bonds, real holdings of deposits, and physical
capital are imposed to rule out explosive solutions.
2.2 Firm’s problem
There is a stand-in firm in the economy, which uses homogeneous capital and labor to produce
a final good, which can be used for consumption, investment, or government purchases,
7






where At denotes the level of total factor productivity in period t, Qt are total hours used,
and α and 1− α are the share of capital and labor, respectively.
In contrast to the standard representation, with one-period ahead nominal contracts, the
firm still maximizes profit but now under the constraint determined by the pre-contracted
wage W ct . We follow Cho’s (1990) approach of including wage contracts in a RBC model.
More specifically, the contractual nominal wage W ct is determined one-period in advance, in
period t − 1. In period t, based on the information available (i.e., kt, At), and taking the
nominal wage as given, the firm hires labor on the labor demand curve. Importantly, the
contract stipulates also that the household leaves to the firm the right to manage in order for
the firm to maximize profit. In case of an agreement in period t− 1 between the household
and the firm redarding a W ct , in period t the amount of labor demanded by the firm will be
supplied.







t −Rtkt −W ctQt (16)
s.t.
lnW ct = Et−1 lnWt. (17)










Note that the expected and actual capital rental rate are the same. What differs is the price
of labor. To solve for the contracted wage, we take natural logarithms from both sides of
the Walrasian wage equation to obtain
lnWt = lnPt + ln(1− α) + ln yt − lnQt. (20)
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Note that consistency requires that in equilibrium total labor demand equals total labor
supply, or Qt = etnt.
6 Next, and imposing the wage contracting rule by taking expectations
as of period t− 1 yields
lnW ct = Et−1 lnWt = Et−1 lnPt + ln(1− α) + Et−1 ln yt − Et−1 lnQt =
Et−1 lnPt + ln(1− α) + Et−1 ln yt − Et−1 ln et − Et−1 lnnt. (21)
As in Cho and Cooley (1995), the contractual nominal wage is equal to the rational expec-
tations of the household, taken as of date t − 1 of the equilibrium wage at period t of the
Walrasian (perfectly-competitive spot) model.
2.3 Monetary Authority
In this paper the monetary authority (central bank) follows an exogenous process for the
growth rate gt of the money aggregate, Mt. This is an adequate approximation for a central
bank operating under a currency board, where money supply is determined by external
factors (ECB and foreign owned banks borrowing from the mother banks).7
Mt+1 = gtMt. (22)
Note that gt is assumed to be known at the beginning of period t. All money created
(seigniorage) in period t is distributed to the government, and then to the households in a
lump-sum fashion
(gt − 1)Mt = Tt, (23)
where Tt is the lump-sum transfer to the household.
8
6Note that the equilibrium quantity of labor will be determined from the firm. The household satisfy
the firm’s labor demand, whatever the quantity. The firm is holding the right to manage, so it is free to set
employment at the optimal level, as it observes the realization of the technology shock. More specifically,
the firm will equate the marginal product of labor with the expected marginal product of labor, which is the
pre-contracted wage.
7In particular, as shown in a later section, money supply growth rate follows an AR(1) process.
8Alternatively, we can assume that the central bank distributes the seigniorage to the Ministry of Finance,
which in turn distributes it to the household as part of the overall government transfer.
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2.4 Government
In the model setup, the government is levying taxes on labor and capital income, as well as
consumption in order to finance spending on government purchases and government transfers,
as well as roll over government debt. The government budget constraint is as follows:
τ cct + τ






= (1 + ibt)
Bt
Pt
+ gtt + g
c
t (24)
Tax rates and government consumption-to-output ratio would be chosen to match the average
share in data, and government transfers would be determined residually.
2.5 Stochastic process
Total factor productivity, At, is assumed to follow AR(1) processes in logs, in particular
lnAt+1 = (1− ρa) lnA0 + ρa lnAt + εat+1,
where A0 > 0 is steady-state level of the total factor productivity process, 0 < ρa < 1 is
the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and εat ∼ iidN(0, σ2a) are random shocks
to the total factor productivity progress. Hence, the innovations εat represent unexpected
changes in the total factor productivity process.
2.6 Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium (DCE)
Given the processes followed by the stochastic processes {At, gt}∞t=0, average tax rates {τ c, τ y},
endowments k0,m0, b0∀i, the decentralized dynamic competitive equilibrium is a list of se-
quences {ct, it, kt, et, nt,mt}∞t=0, a sequence of government purchases and transfers {gct , gtt}∞t=0,
price level sequence {Pt}∞t=0 and input prices {wct , rt}∞t=0 such that (i) each household i max-
imizes its utility function subject to its budget constraint, the CIA constraint, and the
nominal wage contract; (ii) the representative firm maximizes profit s.t. the nominal wage
contract; (iii) government budget constraint evolves according to its law of motion; (iv)
money supply evolves according to its law of motion; (v) all markets clear.
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3 Data and Model Calibration
To calibrate the model to Bulgarian data, we will focus on the period after the introduction
of the currency board (1999-2014). Annual data on output, consumption and investment was
collected from National Statistical Institute (2016), while the real interest rate is taken from
Bulgarian National Bank Statistical Database (2016). The calibration strategy described
in this section follows a long-established tradition in modern macroeconomics: first, the
discount factor, β = 0.982, as in Vasilev (2017a), is set to match the steady-state capital-to-
output ratio in Bulgaria, k/y = 3.491. The labor share parameter, α = 0.429, was obtained
from Vasilev (2017b) as the average value of labor income in aggregate output over the pe-
riod 1999-2014.
The relative weights attached to the utility out of leisure in the household’s utility func-
tion, θ1 = 12.652, and θ2 = 0.612, are calibrated to match the fact that in steady-state
consumers would supply one-third of their time endowment to working, and the average em-
ployment rate e = 0.533. As in Cho (1990), the curvature parameters are set to σ = 2 and
γ = 1.2 in order to generate plausible value for aggregate labor supply elasticity.9 Next, the
average inflation rate in Bulgaria over the 1999-2016 is 4.6%, and the average annual gross
growth rate of money supply is g = 1.048. Average debt-to-output ratio over the period is
b/y = 0.19.
The depreciation rate of physical capital in Bulgaria, δ = 0.05, was taken from Vasilev
(2015). It was estimated as the average depreciation rate over the period 1999-2014. The
average income tax rate was set to τ y = 0.1, while the tax rate on consumption is set to its
value over the period, τ c = 0.2.10 Lastly, as in Vasilev (2017c), the process followed by total
factor productivity is estimated from the detrended series by running an AR(1) regression
and saving the residuals. Table 1 below summarizes the values of all model parameters used
in the paper.
9As pointed out in Cho (1993), the responsiveness of the quantity of the labor hired to technology shocks
is not affected by the labor supply elasticity but on the labor demand elasticity (i.e. the production function)
10Here we abstract away from excise taxes and import duties.
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Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description Method
β 0.982 Discount factor Calibrated
α 0.429 Capital Share Data average
1− α 0.571 Labor Share Calibrated
δ 0.050 Depreciation rate on physical capital Data average
θ1 12.615 Utility weight Calibrated
θ2 0.612 Utility weight Calibrated
γ 1.200 Curvature, disutility of work Set
σ 2.000 Curvature, disutility of work Set
e 0.533 Employment rate Data average
n 0.333 Share of time spent working Data average
τ c 0.200 VAT/consumption tax rate Data average
τ y 0.100 Average tax rate on income Data average
g 1.012 Gross growth rate of money supply Data average
π 0.047 Average inflation rate Data average
ρa 0.701 AR(1) parameter, total factor productivity Estimated
σa 0.044 st.dev, total factor productivity Estimated
4 Steady-State
Once the values of model parameters were obtained, the steady-state equilibrium system
solved, the ”big ratios” can be compared to their averages in Bulgarian data. The results are
reported in Table 2 below. The model matches consumption-to-output ratio by construction;
The investment and government purchases ratios are also closely approximated. The shares
of income are also identical to those in data, which is an artifact of the assumptions imposed
on functional form of the aggregate production function.
The after-tax return, net of depreciation, r̃ = (1− τ y)r − δ, is also very closely captured by
the model.
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Table 2: Data Averages and Long-run Solution
Variable Description Data Model
y Steady-state output N/A 0.568
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.674 0.674
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175
gc/y Government cons-to-output ratio 0.159 0.151
b/y Debt-to-output ratio 0.190 0.190
wn/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429
n Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333
r̃ After-tax net return on capital 0.056 0.057
5 Out of steady-state model dynamics
Since the model does not have an analytical solution for the equilibrium behavior of variables
outside their steady-state values, we need to solve the model numerically. This is done by
log-linearizing the original equilibrium (non-linear) system of equations around the steady-
state. This transformation produces a first-order system of stochastic difference equations.
First, we study the dynamic behavior of model variables to an isolated shock to the total
factor productivity process, and then we fully simulate the model to compare how the second
moments of the model perform when compared against their empirical counterparts. Special
focus is put on the cyclical behavior of labor market variables.
5.1 Impulse Response Analysis
This subsection documents the impulse responses of model variables to a 1% surprise inno-
vation to technology. The impulse response function (IRFs) are presented in Fig. 1 below.
As a result of the one-time unexpected positive shock to total factor productivity, output
increases. This expands the availability of resources in the economy, so consumption and
government consumption also increase upon impact. Note that investment is countercyclical,
due to the presence of private consumption, private investment, and government consump-
tion in the CIA constraint, which means that those output components are to a certain
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a 1% surprise innovation in technology
degree substitutes. More specifically, government consumption moves perfectly with output,
and consumption reacts more than output to the technology shock, so investment has to
move down.
This new dynamics is driven by the nominal wage contracts. Since wages are pre-determined
one period in advance, and prices increase following the increase in output, real wages fall
upon impact of the technology shock. As a result, hours and employment fall. In turn,
real interest fall due to the fall in the marginal product of labor. This is because hours and
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capital are complements in the production function. The decrease in the return on capital
drives down investment and capital accumulation. In the money market, the increase in
output increases the transaction demand for money and decreases the demand for bonds.
As a result, the price of bonds increases, and the nominal interest rate on bonds decreases.
In the period following the unexpected innovation in technology real wages adjust and in-
crease. All households respond to the incentives contained in prices and start accumulating
capital, and supplying more hours worked. In the labor market, the increase in the marginal
product of labor also makes the value of marginal product of labor higher, so firms increase
employment. In turn, the increase in employment further increases output. After this de-
layed effect, the model variables return to their old steady-states in a monotone fashion as
the effect of the one-time surprise innovation in technology dies out.
5.2 Simulation and moment-matching
We will now simulate the model 10,000 times for the length of the data horizon. Both empir-
ical and model simulated data is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter. Table
3 on the next page summarizes the second moments of data (relative volatilities to output,
and contemporaneous correlations with output) versus the same moments computed from
the model-simulated data at annual frequency.11 To minimize the sample error, the simu-
lated moments are averaged out over the computer-generated draws. The model matches
quite well the absolute volatility of output. However, the model substantially overestimates
the variability in consumption, and investment. This shortcoming of the model could be
explained by structural factors in Bulgaria, such as privatization of state assets, and the
short annual time series for Bulgaria. In addition, public investment in infrastructure has
been also substantial in the last few years due to the EU accession funds. Still, the model is
qualitatively consistent with the stylized fact that investment is more volatile than output.
By construction, government spending in the model varies as much as in data.
With respect to the labor market variables, the variability of employment predicted by the
model is less than in data, but the variability of wages in the model is higher than that in
11The model-predicted 95 % confidence intervals are available upon request.
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corr(c, y) 0.85 0.83
corr(i, y) 0.61 -0.27
corr(g, y) 0.31 1.00
corr(n, y) 0.49 0.42
corr(w, y) -0.01 0.82
corr(u, y) -0.47 -0.41
corr(n, y/n) -0.14 0.68
data.The model fails in matching unemployment volatility. In the model it varies as much as
the employment rate. The reason behind this mismatch could be driven by several possible
explanatory factors: the fact that the model misses the ”out-of the-labor-force” segment, as
well as the significant emigration to EU member states.
Next, in terms of contemporaneous correlations, the model slightly over-predicts the pro-
cyclicality of the main aggregate variables - consumption and government consumption.
This, however, is a common limitation of this class of models. In addition, investment is
counter-cyclical due to the presence of a modified CIA constraint that incorporates also
investment and government consumption. Still, along the labor market dimension, the con-
temporaneous correlation of employment with output, and unemployment with output, is
relatively well-matched. With wages, the model predicts strong cyclicality, while wages in
data are acyclical.
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In the next subsection, we investigate the dynamic correlation between labor market vari-
ables at different leads and lags, thus evaluating how well the model matches the phase
dynamics among variables. In addition, the autocorrelation functions (ACFs) of empiri-
cal data, obtained from an unrestricted VAR(1) are put under scrutiny and compared and
contrasted to the simulated counterparts generated from the model.
5.3 Auto- and cross-correlation
This subsection discusses the auto-(ACFs) and cross-correlation functions (CCFs) of the ma-
jor model variables. The coefficients empirical ACFs and CCFs at different leads and lags
are presented in Table 4 against the simulated AFCs and CCFs. Following Canova (2007),
this comparison is used as a goodness-of-fit measure. As seen from Table 4 on the next
page, the model compares well vis-a-vis data. Empirical ACFs for output and investment
are slightly outside the confidence band predicted by the model, while the ACFs for total
factor productivity and household consumption are well-approximated by the model.
The persistence of labor market variables are also well-described by the model dynamics:
the ACFs unemployment and wages are close to the simulated ones until the third lag. Same
holds true for output and investment. The ACF for consumption and employment is well-
captured only until the first lag. Overall, the model with one-period nominal wage contracts
generates the right persistence in model variables, and is able to respond to the criticism in
Nelson and Plosser (1992), Cogley and Nason (1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996),
who argue that the RBC class of models do not have a strong internal propagation mech-
anism besides the strong persistence in the TFP process. Furthermore, the nominal wage
mechanism dominates other non-Walrasian models such as Vasilev (2016, 2017b,d).
Next, as seen from Table 5 on the next page, over the business cycle, in data labor pro-
ductivity leads employment. The model with nominal wage contracts, however, cannot
account for this fact. In this model, as well as in the standard RBC model a technology
shock can be regarded as a factor shifting the labor demand curve, while holding the labor
supply curve constant. Therefore, the effect between employment and labor productivity
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Table 4: Autocorrelations for Bulgarian data and the model economy
k
Method Statistic 0 1 2 3
Data corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.765 0.552 0.553
Model corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.818 0.629 0.442
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.035) (0.063) (0.084)
Data corr(et, et−k) 1.000 0.484 0.009 0.352
Model corr(et, et−k) 1.000 0.818 0.629 0.442
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.035) (0.063) (0.084)
Data corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.810 0.663 0.479
Model corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.915 0.625 0.438
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.039) (0.070) (0.094)
Data corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.702 0.449 0.277
Model corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.814 0.624 0.437
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.038) (0.072) (0.096)
Data corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.971 0.952 0.913
Model corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.816 0.626 0.439
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.036) (0.065) (0.089)
Data corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.810 0.722 0.594
Model corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.816 0.629 0.442
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.038) (0.063) (0.084)
Data corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.760 0.783 0.554
Model corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.816 0.628 0.442
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.035) (0.063) (0.084)
is only a contemporaneous one. Still, the model with nominal wage contracts is a clear
improvement over the perfectly-competitive labor market paradigm used in Vasilev (2009).
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Table 5: Dynamic correlations for Bulgarian data and the model economy
k
Method Statistic -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Data corr(nt, (y/n)t−k) -0.342 -0.363 -0.187 -0.144 0.475 0.470 0.346
Model corr(nt, (y/n)t−k) -0.023 -0.017 -0.040 0.708 0.022 0.016 0.012
(s.e.) (0.738) (0.648) (0.532) (0.572) (0.516) (0.635) (0.724)
Data corr(nt, wt−k) 0.355 0.452 0.447 0.328 -0.040 -0.390 -0.57
Model corr(nt, wt−k) -0.023 -0.017 -0.040 0.708 0.022 0.016 0.012
(s.e.) (0.738) (0.648) (0.532) (0.572) (0.516) (0.635) (0.724)
6 Conclusions
We augment an otherwise standard business cycle model with a richer government sector,
and add a modified cash in advance considerations, and one-period-ahead nominal wage con-
tracts. In particular, the cash in advance constraint of Cooley and Hansen (1989) is extended
to include private investment and government consumption. This specification, together with
the nominal wage rigidity, when calibrated to Bulgarian data after the introduction of the
currency board (1999-2016), gives a role to money in propagating economic fluctuations. In
addition, the combinations of these ingredients allows the framework to reproduce better
observed variability and correlations among model variables, and those characterizing the
labor market in particular. These results suggest that technology shocks seem to be the
dominant source of economic fluctuations, but nominal wage contracting might be an im-
portant aspect of the labor markets in Bulgaria, which should be incorporated in any model
that studies cyclical movements in employment and wages. Still, the model suffers from
some of the usual shortcomings inherent in this class of RBC models. As a suggestion for
future research, the model might be extended to accommodate other important (and real)
frictions in the labor market, possibly along the lines of Vasilev (2016, 2017b, 2017d), and
study the interplay between nominal and real rigidities.
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6.2 FOC employment rate
γnγn̂t = λ̂t + ŵ
c
t (26)





γn̂t] = λ̂t + ŵ
c
t + n̂t (27)
6.4 Euler equation
λλ̂t + µµ̂t = βλ[1− δ + (1− τ)r]λ̂t+1 + µ(1− δ)µ̂t+1
+βλ(1− τ)rŷt+1 − βλ(1− τ)rk̂t+1 (28)
6.5 FOC bonds
ibîbt+1 = λλ̂t + µµ̂t. (29)
6.6 FOC real money holdings
mm̂t = yŷt (30)
6.7 Precontracted Wages
ŵct = ŷt−1 − n̂t−1 − êt−1 (31)
6.8 Real int.rate
r̂t = ŷt − k̂t (32)
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